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Introduction 
 
The transformation of electricity systems is raising important issues today in Europe 
regarding territorial inequalities. With different institutional designs between countries 
(Glachant, Finon, 2003; Wollmann, Marcou, 2010; Birchfield, Duffield, 2011), the 
opening up of markets to competition is challenging previous models of utilities 
regulation, which were characterized by an over-riding concern for territorial and 
social cohesion. All of these models were based on the modern infrastructural ideal, 
which claimed to ensure a certain degree of homogeneity in treatment among users, 
against the backdrop of the growth of the welfare state (Graham, Marvin, 2001). They 
were supported by many mechanisms of solidarity, in production, transportation and 
provision, organized on national or regional levels. Some of them were very strong, 
like in France, as they were intended to impose national unified tariffs for certain 
categories of customers (Poupeau, 2007). Others were weaker, because based on a 
different conception of social and political integration. With liberalization, this ideal 
has however been called into question, to the benefit of logics more attuned to 
differentiation between users and territories. Monopolies are tending to disappear or 
to be replaced by more numerous public or private operators, which are increasingly 
segmenting their offers, discriminating between their customers, or making 
investments targeted at certain appealing areas (Graham, Marvin, 2001). This trend 
towards territorial differentiation is indirectly supported by the dynamics of 
decentralization in many European countries. Cities today are the main beneficiaries 
of governments’ locational policies implemented since the 1990s, based on the idea 
of “necessary” competition between regions as a factor in economic competitiveness 
(Scott, 2001; Brenner, 2004). As a successor to spatial Keynesianism (1960s-1970s) 
and endogenous development (1980s) policies, these strategies focus above all on 
metropolises, which raises the question of the place that is subsequently granted to 
other regions located on their periphery, which are often rural. This question is raised 
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with particular acuteness in the case of energy, where cities are implementing 
increasingly ambitious and autonomous policies in terms of the development of 
sustainable energy sources, the fight against climate change, or the deployment of 
smart networks (Bulkeley, 2013; Urban Studies, 2014; Energy Policy, 2015). 
 
In this article, we argue that these two processes (liberalization, decentralization) 
result in new kinds of conflict within infra-national territories, and namely between 
rural and urban areas, concerning the (un)equal access to a “clean”, affordable and 
quality energy. We propose to study them through the concept of “local geopolitics”. 
Borrowed from the study of international relations, geopolitics can be defined as the 
“analysis of the interaction between, on the one hand, geographical settings and 
perspectives and, on the other, political processes. [...] Both geographical settings 
and political processes are dynamic, and each influences and is influenced by the 
other. Geopolitics addresses the consequences of this interaction” (Cohen, 2015: 
16). This concept puts at the heart of the analysis the study of rivalries between 
actors, whether public or private, local or national, with regard to the control of 
territory’s resources. These resources are multiple: natural (raw materials, water, 
etc.), economic (access to a market, supply chain or sector of activity), political 
(holding positions of power) or symbolic (identity, culture). Their appropriation allows 
actors or groups of actors to be able to develop territorialization strategies, which 
Robert Sack defines as “the attempt by an individual or a group to affect, influence, or 
control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control 
over a geographic area. This area will be called the territory” (Sack, 1986: 19). 
 
Due to their importance in daily life, energy issues are at the heart of new geopolitical 
issues. They have been the subject of many studies in international relations analysis 
(Goldthau, 2013; Considine, Paik, 2018; Davidson et al., 2018; Goldthau et al., 
2018), focused on regions (Middle East, Europe, America, Asia, etc.), social or 
environmental issues (climate change, poverty and development, etc.), resources 
(oil, gas, renewable energy, etc.), sub-sectors (production, infrastructures, provision, 
housing, etc.), or types of actors (state, international organizations, private 
companies, NGOs, etc.). But very few researches have applied this concept to 
analyse ongoing processes of energy transition on a national and infra-national 
scale. Instead, they have preferred to use the notion of governance. In our opinion, 
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however, the concept of geopolitics is particularly useful for analysing the emerging 
conflicts attending these processes. Whereas governance is more appropriate for 
describing coordination processes and the state of relationships and power struggles, 
geopolitics aims to link them to an in-depth analysis of the resources targeted by 
appropriation strategies. This approach requires us to adopt a dual perspective. The 
first step consists in mapping a “territorial political economy” of the sector under 
scrutiny, in order to identify what kind of resources are at stake for local actors, in 
terms of geographical settings. The second step implies focussing on the political 
strategies that these actors try to develop to control these resources, and the 
different means and networks they mobilize. 
 
To illustrate this, we will consider the example of the institutional power struggles in 
which metropolitan and rural elected officials have taken part for the control of public 
electricity distribution networks in France. This country is strongly affected by the 
problem of territorial differentiation, given its geographic and political features: 23% of 
its population still lives in rural areas, without counting the outskirts of cities, which 
are often urban-rural hybrids. Its population density is 112 inhabitants/km2 (compared 
to 231 for Germany, 251 for the United Kingdom, 198 for Italy and 77 for Spain1), 
which results in comparatively high network investment and operation costs, for 
energy as well as other public services (digital networks, postal services, railway 
transportation, etc.). Moreover, France is characterized by a conception of the public 
service as being highly unified and centralized, concerned about equality among 
consumers (Jacobin tradition). Territorial solidarity expectations are therefore 
elevated and are likely to rally numerous actors. These two characteristics 
(geographic and political) make this country an interesting case for studying the 
processes of territorial recomposition between metropolitan and rural areas. 
 
Based on a corpus of several field studies2, we show that French local institutional 
disputes around the control of electricity networks reflect a real ability of rural actors, 
located on the periphery of metropolitan areas, to resist the territorial recomposition 
processes threatening them. To prevent their regions from being relegated to the 
simple status of a passive hinterland of large metropolitan centres, many local 
elected officials have been mobilizing against these trends, and seeking to participate 
in territorial recomposition. Grouped together around long-standing institutions that 
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are very powerful both locally and nationally, they have successfully built a political 
counter-power that is impeding metropolises’ quest for emancipation. By examining 
these types of actor, which are rarely taken into account in territorial governance 
research, we show that metropolises’ capacity for action must be studied along with 
the local geopolitical field to which they pertain. 
 
To this end, we have divided our article into three sections. First, we present a 
“territorial political economy” in the French electricity sector by showing the place that 
local authorities occupy within it. In particular, we show that their room to manoeuvre 
is concentrated primarily around public electricity distribution networks, for which they 
have strong albeit emerging competence. We then analyse the strategies used by 
local actors, both rural and metropolitan, to control these infrastructures. Seriously 
taking into account the question of time is crucial, since the processes of change we 
describe cannot be understood without been placed in a long-term perspective, as 
proposed by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (2010) in their theory of gradual 
institutional change. In the second section, we show how the rural world has been 
able to anticipate the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s-2000s in order to position itself 
as a key player in the territorial regulation of these networks, through a strong 
alliance with the state and EDF (Électricité de France), the public utility which at the 
time had the monopoly. The third section is devoted to the reaction of metropolises, 
which more recently have been trying to free themselves of this regulatory framework 
by seeking increased autonomy and differentiation. It shows that this strategy runs 
into numerous difficulties, due to the previous compromises negotiated with EDF and 
the state, which still significantly limit the leeway of large cities in terms of public 
energy distribution. 
 
 
The territorial political economy of the electricity sector in France 
 
Before moving on to the study of rivalries between metropolises and the rural world, it 
appears necessary to place them in a more general context: that of the electricity 
sector in France and the role played by territorial authorities in its regulation. This first 
stage is essential for understanding the nature of the stakes in the tug-of-war 
between rural and metropolitan elected officials. Contrary to popular belief, the role of 
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local authorities is not negligible in France. We will see this with regard to a highly-
delimited yet major sector: public energy distribution networks. Today, the control of 
this infrastructure constitutes the very core of local conflicts around stakes that are 
both financial (benefiting from a share of the profits generated by the operation of 
networks) and political (defending certain types of users, being able to implement 
public energy transition policies). 
 
 
A fundamental jurisdiction of communes: AODE status 
 
To fully understand current conflicts in France, we have to remember that the 
management of energy networks (electricity, gas, heating networks) has always been 
shared between the state and local authorities (research study 1, see methodological 
annex). This particularity distinguishes this country from other unitary states, such as 
Great Britain, in which local authorities’ powers were limited and then removed, 
starting in the 1930s (Hannah, 1979), even though recent dynamics seem to be re-
initiating new recomposition (Hannon, Bolton, 2015). In France, an entire 
centralization process of this type never took place, despite the extensive state 
intervention from the 1930s and the nationalization of the energy sector in 1946 
(Frost, 1991; Lévy-Leboyer, Morsel, 1994; Chick, 2007; Poupeau, 2017). The 
Communes in France3 have always conserved the status of “energy distribution 
organizing authorities” (AODE, autorités organisatrices de la distribution d’énergie), 
which was granted to them by the Law of 15 June 1906. The model is based on 
concessions, as in Germany. The commune signs a concession contract with an 
operator (usually from the private sector and, after nationalization, with EDF) that 
grants it a service monopoly within its territory for 20 to 30 years. In exchange, the 
commune has the right to monitor rates and the investment policy, and becomes the 
owner of the assets at the end of the contract. This urban service model, which is 
widely used in other utilities in France, such as water (Lorrain, 1992), gives elected 
officials an important role in supplying electricity and gas. 
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The progressive narrowing of the field of concession  
 
In France, regulation of the electricity sector was based on the framework Law of 15 
June 1906, which has never been repealed. This initial framework has however 
changed substantially since the early 20th century in favour of the state. Without 
being eliminated, the communes’ jurisdictions have been progressively reduced. 
Today, they hold power essentially over infrastructure management, whereas rate 
issues, initially included within concession contracts, largely escape from the control 
of AODEs. In the long-term, two main changes have taken place, which have led to 
this new equilibrium between the state and the communes. 
 
The first change was related to the creation of EDF in 1946, following the 
nationalization of former private companies. The state, which controlled this public 
monopoly, encroached upon the communes’ jurisdictions regarding electricity 
distribution. Rates subsequently became a domain shared with the Ministry of 
Finance, which wanted to make them a tool of its macro-economic policy to fight 
inflation. Investments were likewise more strictly controlled by the state, which held 
the reins of the post-war economy (Kuisel, 1984; Frost, 1991). In this new context, 
local authorities lost ground but continued to wield real influence. For political 
reasons, they conserved their AODE status, as supporters of nationalization believed 
that this was the price to pay to rally local elected officials. The maintenance of this 
jurisdiction had significant effects, as it required the state and EDF to include 
communes and their representatives in important strategic decisions made by the 
government (Poupeau, 2017). This local influence was above all exercised to the 
benefit of rural areas through the action of an intergovernmental network (Rhodes, 
Marsh, 1992): the Fédération nationale des collectivités concédantes et régies 
(FNCCR, National federation of licensing authorities and government corporations). 
The FNCCR, created in 1933, grouped together several thousand French communes 
that believed it was necessary to join forces to push the state to intervene and to 
implement more ambitious public policies (e.g. lower rates, electrification of the 
territory). The FNCCR was at the time essentially composed of rural elected officials, 
which held the majority in its governance bodies (board of directors, work groups). 
On the other hand, city elected officials had far weaker representation within it, which 
limited their ability to be heard. They nevertheless preferred to allow the FNCCR to 
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act instead of creating a competing structure likely to weaken communes as a whole 
with respect to the state and EDF. This over-representation of the rural world was 
found in the struggles of the FNCCR during the period of the public-sector monopoly, 
and weighed in favour of a very high degree of territorial integration between cities 
and the countryside. The association was successful in securing total unification of 
electricity prices, in spite of opposition from EDF, which preferred to maintain 
different rates for rural and urban users (Poupeau, 2007). It was also successful in 
obtaining massive investments in rural areas thanks to a fund, the FACÉ (Fonds 
d’amortissement des charges d’électrification), the annual budget of which amounted 
to 500 million euros in the 1950s-1960s4. In exchange for these measures aiming to 
unify the national territory, the FNCCR supported EDF and the state in their 
centralization policy. 
 
The second change arrived with the liberalization process, which was launched in 
Europe at the end of the 1980s (Mc Gowan, 1996; Matlary, 1997). It resulted in a 
second reduction in the local authorities’ field of action. From that point on, reforms 
separated energy supply from network management (the unbundling principle) – two 
activities that had previously fallen within the scope of concession contracts. The 
former was entirely opened up to competition, with only a limited intervention by 
communes (in the name of the free choice of consumers). Only the latter remained 
within their jurisdiction, as it constituted a natural monopoly that had to be regulated 
by the public authorities. The communes remained the owners of distribution 
networks and ensured regulation, alongside the state and through the contracts that 
they signed with EDF-ENEDIS, which operated distribution networks. Figure 1 
represents the new institutional landscape in France that resulted from these reforms, 
from the point of view of local authorities’ action. 
 
Public electricity distribution is now regulated by two main players: the Commission 
de régulation de l’énergie (CRE, the energy regulation commission) on the one hand, 
and the communes on the other. The CRE, a state agency, plays the role of a 
“competition police”. It fixes the transportation rate, the TURPE (Tarif d’utilisation des 
réseaux publics d’électricité), which is a sort of toll compensating EDF-ENEDIS, the 
national firm responsible for operating and developing distribution networks5. It also 
ensures that this company does not develop anti-competition practices with respect 
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to electricity suppliers (EDF-ENEDIS is an EDF subsidiary). The communes are the 
AODEs (and the owners) of public electricity distribution networks (Law of 15 June 
1906). In this capacity, they grant a monopoly over network operation to EDF-
ENEDIS, in exchange for royalties. Currently, this jurisdiction is highly restrictive, as 
communes cannot put EDF-ENEDIS under competition (unlike other countries, where 
this market is open to competition). They moreover all play the role of controlling the 
level of investments and the quality of the electricity supply (number and time of 
outages, efficiency in breakdowns, etc.). They are also involved with the CRE in 
setting the TURPE amount, about which they are consulted. However, their 
responsibilities may increase in the near future, with the potential opening to 
competition of concessions held by EDF-ENEDIS. Such a prospect, which regularly 
comes into play in debates, would constitute a true upheaval within the sector, likely 
to offer the communes more room to manoeuvre. 
 
Figure n°1. Local authorities in the electricity sector in France in 2019 
ACTIVITY UNDER
COMPETITION
REGULATED
ACTIVITY
(STATE)
ACTIVITY UNDER
COMPETITION
REGULATED
ACTIVITY
(STATE AND LOCAL
AUTHORITIES)
PRODUCTION TRANSPORTATION DISTRIBUTION SUPPLY
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electric lines)
Market power 
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Many producers, 
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A single public
monopoly (RTE)
A few public
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Many public and 
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EDF: Électricité de France; ENEL: Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica ; RTE : Réseau de transport 
d’électricité. 
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The control of networks: An important issue in the context of energy transition  
 
This brief presentation shows that one of the main issues for local public authorities 
today is to control the jurisdiction of public electricity distribution. It constitutes the 
heart of their current power (and above all that to come) with respect to other fields 
such as production, transportation and supply, for which they possess far less 
significant levers for action. In the current context of energy transition, this issue is 
manifest in three ways. 
 
The first concern is financial. Given that French communes are the owners of public 
electricity distribution networks, they have exceptional wealth (37 billion euros in 
20136), which they could capitalize on in the event of EDF-ENEDIS coming under 
competition. It is therefore important for them to ensure that the public operator does 
not depreciate this wealth, whether through inadequate investments or through 
accounting operations to their detriment (removing assets from the concession to 
appropriate them for itself). Moreover, AODEs have access to concession royalties 
(316 million euros in 20147) and a portion of local electricity taxes (400 million euros 
in 20118). These very large sums constitute substantial budgetary resources in the 
context of reduced public expenditures that France has experienced since the 
beginning of the 2000s (and some of which can be put to uses other than electricity). 
In the event of opening up to competition or even privatization, these financial flows 
may increase, especially in urban areas, in which the concessions generate the most 
income. 
 
The second concern for local authorities is to ensure that consumers (individuals, 
companies, etc.) located on the outskirts of their concession pay the lowest possible 
distribution costs in order to defend their territory’s appeal (population maintenance, 
economic competitiveness). This takes place through action on the TURPE, which 
accounts for, respectively, around 30% and 50% of low- and high-voltage prices9. 
While communes as a whole are presenting a united front to lower the delivery rate 
paid to EDF-ENEDIS, their interests diverge regarding the territorial differentiation of 
the TURPE. Rural communes wish at all costs to maintain the single rate secured 
after 1946 via the FNCCR, although at the risk of passing excessive increases on to 
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their users. Urban areas, on the other hand, and especially metropolises, know that 
their inhabitants would be the first to benefit from the end of equalization. 
 
The third concern is to compel EDF-ENEDIS to invest in concessions in order to have 
leeway in implementing public energy transition policies. In this respect, we have to 
be careful by using the notion of post-networked society, even in the case of cities 
(Coutard and Rutherford, 2011). We have found that in many territories, the energy 
transition process is always accompanied by a demand for reliable distribution 
networks, especially for electricity. These infrastructure elements constitute essential 
levers in developing renewable energy sources (which are intermittent), electro-
mobility (which requires numerous charging stations for electric vehicles), and smart 
networks (smart cities or smart territories projects). In a context in which EDF-
ENEDIS has limited financial room to manoeuvre10, it is important for local elected 
officials to attempt to best seize their resources to draw them toward their territory. In 
this context once again, rivalries come between local authorities. 
 
 
AODE status: A subject of disputes between metropolitan and rural elected officials 
 
These three main concerns feed a large number of rivalries between local elected 
officials around the control of AODE jurisdiction. Possessing it allows them to engage 
in more favourable power relations with EDF-ENEDIS and the state on these three 
fronts, in a context characterized by the eventuality of the complete opening of the 
market to competition. It also allows them to be able to better shape the future of the 
energy landscape in favour of increased territorial differentiation or, on the contrary, 
the maintenance of a degree of integration inherited from nationalization. As a result, 
in the 1990s an initially latent and then open conflict materialized, primarily between 
two types of local institutions: energy syndicates and metropolises. The former 
originated in the rural electrification syndicates that up until then had managed work 
and public subsidies on behalf of the communes (the Facé funds, mentioned above). 
Initially composed of rural communes, they sought to expand their perimeter to a 
larger scale, that of the département11, by encouraging membership of new 
municipalities, many of which were located on the outskirts of large cities. They also 
sought to acquire AODE status, which they did not yet all have. As for metropolises, 
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they appeared as institutions in the 1990s based on large cities (Paris, Lyon, 
Marseille, Lille, etc.) present within the French territory. Their goal was also to get 
back the AODE jurisdiction from the communes located in their close suburbs, 
contrary to the strategy of energy syndicates. In addition to the issue of boundaries, 
these two actors also opposed one another regarding the content to include in future 
concession contracts: Is it necessary to propose a single model regardless of the 
territory? On the contrary, is it necessary to differentiate clauses as a function of the 
type of AODE (rural or metropolitan) in terms of rates or investments? It is around 
these two main issues (the scope and content of the contract) that a new “local 
energy geopolitics” has come to be structured in France. 
 
 
Attack: The rural world 
 
After having identified the stakes for local authorities in the electricity sector (around 
the regulation of distribution networks), it is necessary to analyse the processes 
through which metropolitan and rural actors try to control this resource in order to 
influence the energy transition trajectory. While some may have thought that reforms 
in the electrical sector would mainly have benefited metropolises in their quest for 
autonomy from the central state (Le Galès, 2002), this was not the case. No such 
process was underway in France when liberalization put an end to energy 
management by large public monopolies. On the contrary, in the local institutional 
landscape that emerged from the 1990s, rural elected officials immediately played a 
major part, which somewhat stifled large cities. To understand this, it is necessary to 
include the institutional variable, in a medium-term perspective (Mahoney, Thelen, 
2010), and take into account the context in which the first reforms were deployed. 
This demonstrates the significant weight of the rural world in France via a network of 
local institutions (energy syndicates) relayed by a powerful national association (the 
FNCCR). Rather than being marginalized, this network was successful in using 
reforms to strengthen its position. It did so by securing the uniformity of concession 
contracts across the entirety of the French territory, from the state and EDF-ENEDIS, 
and by monopolizing the AODE jurisdiction of the majority of communes. 
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Concession contracts: Instruments for a high degree of territorial integration 
 
We have seen that the period preceding the liberalization process did not eliminate 
all forms of influence of local authorities. They remained active in the regulation of the 
energy sector through the actions of the FNCCR at local and national levels. At the 
end of the 1980s, this organization still federated a large majority of communes, 
many of which were grouped within electrification syndicates. It maintained its 
political and administrative power thanks to its relays in the senate and the state. This 
network of actors reacted very quickly when the European Union created its first 
projects to liberalize the energy sector (Mc Gowan, 1996; Matlary, 1997). It feared 
that the reforms would lead to total dismantling of the electricity sector, including 
distribution, causing EDF-ENEDIS to be placed under competition and concession 
contracts to be renegotiated. This process could benefit large and medium-sized 
cities, which were densely-populated territories and were therefore profitable and 
very appealing to new operators. Placed in a position of power, cities could challenge 
the territorial homogenization strategy advocated by the FNCCR and its network of 
syndicates since the time of nationalization. Rates might once again become 
differentiated by commune, along with the investments and financial resources 
(royalties, taxes) tied to contracts. 
 
This scenario did not however come to pass (research study 2). On the contrary and 
paradoxically, the first reforms benefited the rural world. To understand this, we have 
to bear in mind that EDF had no interest in having its distribution branch (ENEDIS) 
crushed, to the benefit of private companies. Distribution generated substantial 
revenue that was useful to EDF for developing its production facilities and its 
transportation networks, and for supporting its international development strategy. 
The public corporation therefore sought to secure it in order to better control the 
opening of the market to competition. To do so, it could count on the support of the 
French state, which followed a strategy very different to that of Great Britain: not 
dismantling EDF but rather turning it into a “national champion” in the conquest of 
new global markets. It could also count on the support of rural elected officials, 
whose interest was to preserve a form of centralization from which they benefited. 
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In this context, EDF-ENEDIS made the choice to strengthen its alliance with the 
FNCCR and its network of electrification syndicates (research studies 2, 3 and 4). It 
decided to choose them as privileged partners to negotiate new concession contracts 
well before reforms were implemented (Poupeau, 2004, 2015). These contracts, 
signed for a period of 20 to 30 years, allowed it to anticipate changes and to prevent 
sudden dismantling. The new treaties provided for a single electricity rate, which 
addressed the demands of rural elected officials. They also provided for identical 
clauses for urban and rural communes in terms of investment policy and 
partnerships. Lastly, they planned to reassess the amount of royalties paid to 
communes (about 100 million euros), giving preference to electrification syndicates 
that covered an entire département, so the more communes that joined, the more 
money they would receive. The mechanism incentivizing association was simple. It 
was based on two newly-created royalties. The first one, called “R1” (or “operation 
royalty”, redevance de fonctionnement), was intended to allow the AODE to exert 
control over the concessionary EDF-ENEDIS (hiring of one or more qualified 
technicians, potential outfitting, etc.). The second, called R2 (or “investment royalty”, 
redevance d’investissement), compensated for a portion of the expenses that AODEs 
could incur on electricity networks. These two royalties were established in order to 
drive communes to group together. The calculation formula contained a multiplier 
factor which was a function of the population covered by the concession: 1 + PC/PD 
(where PC: concession population; PD: population of the département where the 
concession was located). Therefore, a syndicate totalling 100% of the inhabitants of 
its département would benefit from double the royalties, whereas a factor of only 1.2 
would be applied to one that covered only 20% of the département. This difference 
could represent several million euros in certain territories. Through this highly 
incentive system, EDF-ENEDIS was clearly playing into the hands of the FNCCR and 
its network of departmental syndicates in their battle against cities. 
 
 
Forcing the rural-urban union: The renewal of old local institutions 
 
This strategy significantly modified the local institutional energy landscape, driving 
many communes to either establish ad hoc departmental energy syndicates where 
one did not yet exist, or to join those that existed by transferring their AODE 
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jurisdiction to them. In all départements, the directors of the FNCCR and EDF-
ENEDIS organized meetings to present the financial advantages of the operation. 
They also visited reluctant elected officials in order to negotiate certain benefits with 
them (transferring a portion of the royalties and taxes from the syndicate to the 
commune). At the end of 1992 there were already around 10 contracts signed with 
syndicates grouping together on average 97% of the communes in their 
département. In 1994, 56% of French communes had signed the new terms. This 
number had increased to 84% by the end of 1997, which represented 82% of the 
French population (Poupeau, 2004). 
 
This departmental grouping dynamic was facilitated by multiple subsequent laws 
(2006, 2010) (research studies 3, 4 and 11). They were the result of pressure from 
the FNCCR on the Ministry of the Interior, which was seeking to rationalize the 
French administrative map by eliminating certain levels or by mutualizing certain 
technical jurisdictions. Large technical networks (energy, water, transportation, etc.) 
in particular were targeted at the time. Due to this support from both EDF-ENEDIS 
and the Ministry of the Interior, by the end of 2010 there were 85 departmental 
energy syndicates in metropolitan France (out of 90 départements), which reflects the 
success of the strategy implemented by the FNCCR. 
 
Within two decades, the process of the “departmentalization” of public electricity 
distribution has therefore progressed considerably. Energy syndicates are becoming 
increasingly unavoidable institutions not only in the domain of electricity but also 
beyond it, in the management of large technical systems (research study 11). 
Whereas they previously took care only of rural electrification credits, they have 
become AODEs for public electricity distribution networks. The majority of syndicates 
have also diversified their activity, spreading into public lighting, management of the 
energy demand, cartography, grouped energy purchasing, or the production of 
renewable energy (wind, biomass, etc.). Some of them focus on other types of 
utilities, such as gas, waste, or digital networks, which have also led to the 
appearance of high stakes in terms of city-countryside inequalities. This 
transformation demonstrates the power of the rural political lobby, which is capable of 
mobilizing to avoid being subject to neoliberal reforms. 
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The network of departmental syndicates remains heterogeneous across territories12 
(cf. figure n°2). Not all rural elected officials are capable of seizing the opportunities 
offered to them by the new contractual framework. Some of them are unable to 
overcome the reluctance of small cities or communes located on the outskirts of 
metropolises, which are tempted to conserve their autonomy (AODE status) while 
awaiting the opening to competition that they believe to be in their favour. Others 
have run into political conflicts, which are at times based on disputes between people 
(retaining control of the AODE to not play into the hands of an adversary). Three 
syndicates (Vendée, Sipperec, in the suburbs of Paris, and Calvados) with a budget 
of over 120 million euros and a staff of more than 40 people have broken away very 
clearly through the breadth of their means and fields of action (top right in figure n°2). 
They have a wide range of activities and are very important public investors within 
their territory (for the Sipperec, see Bellanger and Poupeau, 2013). However, many 
other syndicates are less organized and still aim to strengthen their position within 
the local politico-administrative landscape (bottom left in figure n°2). Their rise to 
power has been slower. For all of these syndicates, the concern has since been to 
maintain their leadership at a time when metropolitan authorities are attempting to 
carve out a place for themselves in the regulation of energy issues. 
 
Figure n°2. Distribution of energy syndicates in relation to their budgets and staff13 (2010) 
Workforce
Budget (M€)
SDE with a budget 
> 120 M €
SDE with a budget 
> 30 M €
SDE with a budget
< 30 M €
Average of budget : 
30 M €
Average of 
workforce : 
24 persons
 
SDE: Syndicat départemental d’énergie. 
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The counter-attack: The late reaction of metropolises  
 
Faced with this rural dynamic, metropolitan elected officials were outpaced for a long 
time. They attempted to react but met with little success, as they were confronted 
with a coalition of very powerful actors composed of EDF-ENEDIS (hardly inclined to 
lose its monopoly), the state (which sought to support its national “champion”), and 
rural elected officials (dedicated to conserving a high degree of territorial solidarity). 
Most importantly, up until recently, large cities did not have any lobby comparable to 
the FNCCR, and existing organizations (such as the AMGVF14) were not sensitized 
to public energy distribution issues. It was only very progressively, with important 
laws on the establishment and strengthening of metropolises (2014, 2015), that the 
hegemony of the rural world was gradually challenged. 
 
 
From energy-climate plans to networks: The recognition of a metropolitan AODE 
jurisdiction  
 
Starting in the 2000s, France, along with other countries, came to actively support the 
creation of metropolitan institutions (Brenner, 2004). This creation was based on 
existing large cities, to which several communes located on their outskirts were 
added. At the time, multiple municipal jurisdictions were transferred to metropolises: 
economic development, urban planning, public roads, culture, etc. The management 
of large electricity and gas networks was nonetheless an exception, despite it 
constitutes an essential element in the competitiveness of these territories. In reality, 
the state did not dare to touch the existing governance system and the role of 
departmental syndicates out of fear of going against rural elected officials and EDF-
ENEDIS. It preferred to put emphasis on other public policies deemed to be more of 
a priority. With regard to energy, it was more around climate change and energy 
efficiency issues that the new metropolises positioned themselves in the beginning, 
through the POPE15 (13 July 2005) and Grenelle II (12 July 2010) laws (research 
studies 3, 5 and 7). The former introduced a new jurisdiction in support of actions to 
control the energy demand (to help consumers to reduce their expenses). The latter 
made it mandatory to draw up territorial energy climate change plans (PCET, plans 
climat énergie territoriaux), in order to implement France’s international commitments 
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in terms of greenhouse gas reductions. However, these were limited jurisdictions, 
which did not have an effect on the control of public electricity distribution networks 
and the structuring of the energy market. 
 
The systematic transfer of AODE status from communes to metropolises did not start 
until the 2010s. Before that, only a few large cities (Dunkerque, Nantes, Nancy and 
Brest) had succeeded in becoming AODE through strong political will. Elsewhere, 
metropolises collided with the reluctance of communes located on their outskirts, 
either because they already belonged to a departmental syndicate (following the 
process described before), or because they were reluctant to entrust excessive 
power to the metropolitan government. To overcome these obstacles, the issue of 
obligatory transfer was put on the political agenda by France urbaine, an association 
that has represented the interests of metropolises since 2015 (research study 6). The 
elected officials of large cities became aware of the importance of AODE status for 
the implementation of energy policies in terms of planning and financing. The subject 
was addressed multiple times during the national debate on the energy transition, 
organized by the state (2012-2013, research study 5), and above all during 
discussions resulting in new decentralization laws during the 2010s16. On this 
occasion, the representatives of metropolises demanded new transfers of 
responsibility. A harsh debate with the FNCCR ensued. The latter feared a decline in 
departmental energy syndicates, which could lose their communes located on the 
outskirts of large cities. This reduction would have significant political and financial 
consequences. Politically, it would weaken the rural world on the institutional level (as 
syndicates would federate a smaller population), and financially, it would result in 
significant revenue losses, amounting to millions of euros in certain cases. The 
FNCCR, whose future was at stake, mobilized its full political weight (parliament, the 
Ministry of the Interior) to limit this risk (research study 5). 
 
A compromise was finally found between the FNCCR and representatives of 
metropolises during the vote on the MAPTAM law in 2014. Since then, the 
metropolises have had AODE status for public distribution networks for electricity, 
gas, and heating/cooling17. However, the communes that belong to the metropolitan 
areas are not obliged to leave energy syndicates if they have already joined one. If 
they wish to remain within the syndicates (and to retain the advantages derived from 
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them), they are represented by metropolises within government bodies 
(“representation-substitution” principle). The law therefore enacted the obligation of 
cooperation, which was subsequently strengthened by a law on energy transition (7 
August 2015). While it required syndicates to implement joint consultation 
commissions to better include the requests of metropolises, it also and above all 
allowed them to conserve numerous communes, at times playing on their fear of 
being absorbed by their powerful metropolitan neighbour. 
 
 
Between cohabitation and conflict: A brief summary of new local geopolitics 
 
These changes have resulted in multiple local geopolitical configurations (research 
studies 7 and 8). It is possible to distinguish two main cases. In certain situations 
(Nantes, Lille), the boundaries of metropolises and syndicates do not overlap, which 
has not resulted in direct conflict. Since then, the two actors have cohabited more 
than they have cooperated. In Dijon, for example, the metropolis manages its own 
public policies (smart networks, the fight against greenhouse gas emissions, the 
development of renewable energy, etc.), without strong ties with the syndicate that 
surrounds it. In other cases, such as Lyon, the boundaries of the metropolis and the 
syndicate overlap and have required the implementation of forms of coordination in 
order to avoid a crisis in the governance of electricity networks (inability to agree on 
the investments to be made, absence of a unifying project, etc.). 
 
In the latter case, tensions appeared primarily around the issue of the representation 
of the metropolis within energy syndicate governance bodies. This has been an 
important issue for metropolitan elected officials: it consists in ensuring that the 
problems of metropolis are not ignored by the syndicates, which are often insensitive 
to urban issues, to the links between energy and transportation, and to climate 
change issues (unlike cities, they are not responsible for energy-climate plans). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that conflicts have emerged around representation 
rules. While the MAPTAM Law has imposed a ceiling on the representation of 
metropolises at 49% of voting rights, it has not given any precise indication of the 
method for calculating the seats. Metropolises have emphasized the population 
criterion because it favours them (around 49% of the total number of seats would 
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belong to them in certain cases). Syndicates, on the other hand, argue for the 
criterion of investments to implement across the concession territory, as it prioritizes 
rural areas and their significant needs in this regard. Many conflicts, some of which 
still endure today, clearly demonstrate that even when required to grant a larger 
place to metropolises, departmental energy syndicates do not give up their 
leadership in terms of network regulation. 
 
 
A new “contractual Yalta” between metropolises and energy syndicates  
 
Parallel to this process, metropolises attempted to review the concession contracts 
signed in the 1990s with EDF-ENEDIS (research studies 8 to 10). As we saw in the 
second section, at the time, these contracts had been highly favourable to rural 
elected officials. The latter had obtained numerous advantages for their syndicates, 
while retaining a system with little differentiation between territories (single rate, 
identical terms). Faced with the centralizing coalition composed of the FNCCR, EDF-
ENEDIS, and the state, the representatives of metropolises had only been successful 
in obtaining minor adjustments, in the form of a “large cities protocol” (Poupeau, 
2004, 2015). This charter, of a non-contractual nature, was somewhat more attuned 
to the particularities of metropolitan territories, in the form of partnerships 
(development of electric vehicles, participation in local projects, etc.). However, the 
political economy of concession contracts remained fundamentally unchanged, as 
neither EDF, nor the state, nor the FNCCR wished to revise the standardized frame. 
 
Discussions with city representatives were resumed in the 2010s, at a time when 
many concession contracts signed 20 to 30 years earlier were expiring. Metropolitan 
elected officials were in somewhat more of a position of power than they had been at 
the beginning of the 1990s. The expertise of large cities had increased significantly 
with regard to energy issues. The jurisdictions of metropolises had grown, around the 
energy and climate plans and then the management of distribution networks (AODE 
status). Yet despite these advantages, city representatives experienced difficulties in 
obtaining additional progress on concession contracts. The directors of France 
urbaine, an association of elected officials which had become a rival of the FNCCR, 
hesitated to step into a new phase by requesting the dismantling of the centralized 
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model: the end of the single rate (TURPE), the differentiation of concession contracts 
based on territories, and the placement of EDF-ENEDIS in a situation of competition. 
As many of them belonged to the Socialist Party, in reality they were very attached to 
the maintenance of the public monopoly, along with the majority of their voters. 
Moreover, they were on the same political side as the governments in power (under 
the presidency of François Hollande), which did not want to address a controversial 
issue at a time when they were experiencing significant difficulties. For this reason, 
France urbaine decided to nurture its relations with the FNCCR and its network of 
energy syndicates. EDF-ENEDIS changed little in its position. It became aware of the 
necessity of renewing political alliances by giving more weight to metropolises as 
emerging partners in the energy transition, but did not dare confront the FNCCR in 
the domain of differentiation, fearing that it would break the alliance established 
several years earlier. 
 
In this context, in June 2016, France urbaine and EDF-ENEDIS signed an agreement 
protocol on new concession contracts18. In it, the association noted its commitment to 
equality in the treatment of territories and the maintenance of a single transportation 
rate. In return, EDF-ENEDIS made multiple commitments with regard to finance 
(greater transparency on the assets of concessions, an increase in royalties), 
investments (participation in the creation of metropolitan master plans), and 
environmental and societal actions (the fight against energy poverty, support 
promoting electro-mobility, experiments on smart networks, etc.). These provisions 
pushed the limits of a centralized system to the hilt. However, by no means did they 
undermine the principles of the organization and regulation of the electricity sector, 
thereby once again showing the capacity for resistance of the rural lobby. 
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Conclusion 
 
Because they are underpinned by a differentiation logic (between users, between 
operators, between spaces), in a context of decentralization, neoliberal reforms give 
rise to territorial conflicts in the regulation of the energy sector. Many rivalries have 
thus emerged within cities (Blanchet, 2015; Späth, Rohracher, 2015; Becker et al., 
2017), between cities and states (Monstadt, 2007; Poupeau, 2014; Hannon, Bolton, 
2015; Monstadt, Wolff, 2015; Rocholl, Bolton, 2016), and between cities and the rural 
territories surrounding them. This article has illustrated this by showing how, over the 
span of two decades, the control of these public electricity distribution networks in 
France has become a subject of major conflict between metropolitan and rural 
elected officials, due to the place occupied by infrastructure in the energy transition 
process. In fact, important issues come into play for local public authorities, with 
regard both to financing (capturing a portion of the profits generated by utilities) and 
to public policy (defending certain types of consumers, preserving the appeal of 
territories threatened by economic changes). These rivalries have led to strategies 
developed by both rural and metropolitan areas’ representatives to control these 
infrastructures, by mobilizing many resources: institutional, political and legal (cf. 
Table n°1). As a result, a kind of “partition” of the French territory or, to put it another 
way, a new geopolitical order around the management of energy infrastructures, is 
emerging between, on the one hand, large syndicates representing rural areas, and, 
on the other, metropolises as they become more autonomous yet remain unable to 
contest the national frame and the main solidarity mechanisms. 
 
These rivalries do not mean that urban and rural territories are necessarily opposed 
to one another in all respects. Forms of cooperation do also exist, for example with 
regard to the development of renewable energy sources (Géocarrefour, 2015). Yet at 
times they exist alongside more conflictual situations. It is therefore necessary to 
consider the urban-rural relationship in detail and in context, in relation to issues 
under scrutiny. To this end, the “local geopolitics” approach appears to be 
heuristically useful, precisely because it requires specific knowledge of the stakes 
(which are at times hidden) of territorial recompositions, as well as the set of political, 
economic, and legal resources that are mobilized by actors. While such an 
examination may seem very technical and dry for a non-specialist reader poorly 
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informed of certain “technical” subtleties (legal rules, the analysis of the economic 
value chain, etc.), we nonetheless believe it to be essential, for otherwise we could 
fall into the trap of certain research on local governance which fails to carry out a 
detailed analysis of the fields of public action that it studies (territorialized political 
economy of the sector, analysis of the interplay of actors from a multi-level 
perspective, etc.). 
 
Table n°1. Resources used by rural and metropolitan areas’ representatives to design a new 
geopolitics of distribution networks management in electricity 
Kind of resources Rural areas’ representatives Metropolitan areas’ 
representatives 
Intergovernmental networks FNCCR France Urbaine 
Institutional allies EDF (and ENEDIS) 
Ministry of Interior 
Senate 
Actors calling for large-scale 
decentralization (in State 
administrations, associations 
of local authorities, new 
operators, NGOs, etc.) 
Political arguments National solidarity 
Protection of the national 
champion (EDF) against 
liberalization 
Globalization (through strong 
metropolises) 
Energy transition (urban 
areas as key territories) 
Legal aspects Concession contracts with EDF 
(incentives) 
Laws of 2006 and 2010 
(promotion of large syndicates 
in energy) 
Laws of 2014 (creation of 
metropolises) and 2015 
(energy transition) 
EDF: électricité de France; FNCCR: Fédération nationale des collectivités concédantes et régies; 
NGO: Non-governmental organization. 
 
Beyond energy, one of the major findings of this article is to show that 
metropolization processes must not be analysed solely through the lens of the 
rescaling strategies carried out by states over the past twenty years or more 
(Brenner, 2004; Jonas, Ward, 2007; Kübler, Lefèvre, 2018) or the ability of 
metropolises to establish themselves as collective actors (Le Galès, 2002; Heinelt, 
Kübler, 2005; Kantor et al., 2012; Evers, de Vries, 2013; Keil et al., 2016). The 
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policies followed by states are certainly central for explaining and understanding 
these phenomena, in view of the major role that they play in territorial 
recompositions. Moreover, metropolises’ assertion of their role depends on the ability 
of their political and administrative elite to rally and federate the actors in their 
territory around a common political project. These two classic explanatory factors 
could however be improved by an analysis of the power relations that link 
metropolises to other local political institutions (regions, provinces, counties, rural 
communes, etc.). The example of energy illustrates this well. The obstacles that 
metropolises encounter in their quest for leadership in energy do not stem solely from 
the attitude of the state, which in France is more reluctant to liberalize the sector than 
in other countries, in order to preserve its “national champion” (EDF) and its social 
model, which is highly redistributive. They also stem from the existence of powerful 
rural institutions in this sector at both local (departmental energy syndicates) and 
national (the FNCCR) levels. In favour of maintaining a form of centralization, today, 
these institutions play an important counter-power role in the metropolization process 
by opposing differentiation strategies. To do so, they mobilize numerous resources, 
as noted above. It is by also looking at this type of actor, midway between the 
national (state) and local (metropolises) levels, that we can better understand the 
metropolization process. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. FNCCR, “Quel mode de gestion pour les services publics locaux de l’électricité ?”, 
2011, pp. 14-15 (the statistics are those of INSEE, 2007). 
2. This publication draws on research on the French energy sector over the past 
twenty years, which has resulted in multiple publications in French. For more 
information, see the methodological annex. We thank Daniel Florentin, Olivier 
Labussière and Jonathan Rutherford for their opinions and advice. 
3. Created under the French Revolution, communes (or municipalities) constitute the 
smallest politico-administrative division in the country. They are headed by a mayor 
elected through indirect universal suffrage. The population of the 35,000 French 
communes ranges from a few inhabitants to several million (Paris, Lyon, Marseille, 
etc.). 
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4. Poupeau, 2017. It amounted to 400 million in 2017 (source: Sénat). 
5. With around 170 local distribution companies that service 5% of the French 
territory. On these actors, cf. Gabillet, 2015. 
6. CRE. 
7. CRE. 
8. Cour des comptes, Rapport public annuel 2013, p. 133. 
9. CRE, 2017. 
10. A report from the Cour des comptes (doc. cit., pp. 140-141) mentions the fact that 
EDF-ENEDIS serves as a veritable “cash cow” for its shareholder EDF (financing of 
its international investment policy) and indirectly for the French state (reduction of 
public deficits). Between 2008 and 2011, ENEDIS often paid at least 75% of its net 
profit to its parent company. 
11. In 2017, France had 101 départements. As their size is between that of 
communes and that of regions, départements are political and administrative areas 
which allow for solidarity between rural and urban areas. Attaining this size is 
therefore an essential goal for syndicates. 
12. SEA Conseil en stratégie, Altime Charles Riley, “La distribution d’électricité en 
France. Quelles évolutions ? Organisation territoriale de l’énergie et évolution des 
métiers”, Janvier 2011). The data that follow are drawn from this study (sample: 
n=57). 
13. SEA Conseil en stratégie, Altime Charles Riley (doc. cit., p. 11). Translated from 
French by the author. 
14. The Association des maires des grandes villes de France (the association of 
mayors of large cities in France) was created in 1974. 
15. Loi de programmation fixant les orientations de la politique énergétique (the 
framework legislation establishing the orientations of the energy policy). 
16. The MAPTAM Law (Modernisation de l’action publique territoriale et d’affirmation 
des métropoles, Modernization of public territorial action and affirmation of 
metropolises) of January 27, 2014 and the NOTRe law (on the New territorial 
organization of the Republic, Nouvelle organisation territoriale de la République) of 
August 17, 2015. 
17. With the exception of the Metropolis of Greater Paris, which did not obtain this 
jurisdiction. 
18. From the France urbaine website. 
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Methodological annex 
 
This article is based on a longitudinal analysis of the transformations that have 
affected the public electricity distribution sector in France from the 1990s to the 
2010s. It draws on several successive surveys, archives, interviews (200 for the 
whole period) and participation in formal and informal meetings. 
 
 
The historical aspects (up to the 1990s) are based on two main works. 
 
Research study 1. This historical analysis (before liberalization) is based on the 
consultation of archives provided by the state, EDF and the FNCCR. This work was 
published in a book (Poupeau, 2017). 
 
Research study 2. The recomposition of the 1990s was analysed in a PhD thesis 
defended in 1999 at Sciences Po Paris (former Institut d’études politiques de Paris) 
on the strategy of contracting between EDF and local authorities (Poupeau, 1999). 
100 semi-structured interviews were conducted with actors at national (definition of 
contract clauses) and local levels (implementation of contractualization and 
resistance phenomena). 
 
 
Changes during the years 2000 have been analyzed through nine research studies. 
 
Research study 3. A seminar on the role of local authorities in the energy transition 
process, bringing together academics and professionals (representatives of local 
authorities, state administrations, operators, NGOs, etc.). It was co-organized with 
the French Ministry of Ecology in 2008-2009 (10 workshops). Files are available at 
the website http://www.urbanisme-puca.gouv.fr/politiques-energetiques-locales-2008-
2009-a378.html 
 
Research study 4. A case study about the history of the Sipperec (1924-2013), 
which is the largest energy syndicate in France (archives, interviews). This 
monograph was published in 2013 (Bellanger and Poupeau, 2013). 
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Research study 5. Participation, as an academic expert, in the national debate 
organized by the French Ministry of Ecology to prepare the vote on the law of 2015 
on energy transition (participation in the group working on the issues of governance) 
(no publication). 
 
Research study 6. Survey on the strategy of ENEDIS (EDF) to negotiate new 
concession contracts with local authorities (2013-2014): interviews with ENEDIS 
executives and representatives of the FNCCR and France Urbaine (no publication for 
the moment, elements in Bellanger and Poupeau, 2013). 
 
Research study 7. Co-organization of an academic seminar about territorial 
innovation in the field of energy (Marcou et al., 2015). 
 
Research study 8. Coordination (with Carine Staropoli, Paris School of Economics) 
of a survey “New contractual practices in the distribution of energy in France and 
Europe” (2016, in partnership with the French energy council). 
 
Research study 9. Supervision of a Master’s thesis “Analyse des contrats de 
concession de distribution publique de gaz et d’électricité. Vers une recomposition de 
la politique publique locale de l’énergie ? » (Corinne Belvèze, with the City of Paris). 
 
Research study 10. Supervision of a PHD thesis ‘Les stratégies de transition 
énergétique des métropoles françaises’ (Mathilde Marchand, started in 2017). 
 
Research study 11. Supervision of a survey on the energy syndicates in France, 
with a quantitative (status, organizations, budgets, fields of intervention) and 
qualitative methodology (two case studies on the cooperation between syndicates, 
regions and metropolises) (Boyer, 2019). 
 
